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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ABSTENTION DOCTRINE-Younger v.
Harris EXTENDED TO CIVIL PROCEEDINGS. Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.1 the sheriff and prosecuting attorney
of Allen County, Ohio initiated public nuisance proceedings2 against
the management of a movie theatre showing pornographic films. By
statute, any theatre displaying pornographic films is a public nui-
sance3 that may be closed for up to one year. Additionally, personal
property used to conduct the nuisance may be sold.4 The Ohio court
ordered the theatre closed.5 Instead of appealing within the state
judicial system, however, defendants initiated proceedings in federal
district court, alleging a section 19836 deprivation of federal constitu-
tional rights under color of state law.7 Defendants sought to have the
nuisance statute declared unconstitutional and the Ohio proceedings
enjoined. A three-judge district court8 permanently enjoined that
portion of the state court order closing the theatre to films not yet
1. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
2. The proceedings were initiated under Ohio's public nuisance statute, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3767.01-.99 (1971).
3. Id. § 3767.01(C):
As used in all sections of the Revised Code relating to nuisances:
(C) 'Nuisance' means that which is defined and declared by statutes
to be such and also means any place in or upon which lewdness, assignation,
or prostitution is conducted, . . . or exists, or any place, in or upon which
lewd, indecent, lascivious, or obscene films . . . are ... exhibited, or other-
wise. . . shown, and the personal property and contents used in conducting
and maintaining any such place for any such purpose.
4. Id. § 3767.06.
5. State ex rel. Huffman v. Dakota, No. 72 CIV 0326 (C.P. Allen County,
Ohio, Nov. 30, 1972).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). In Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Court held that § 1983 was an exception to 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (1965). See note 18 infra. The Court cautioned, however, that it
was not qualifying Younger, which still must be considered before a federal court is to
exercise jurisdiction. Mitchum v. Foster, supra at 242-43; Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564 (1973); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973).
7. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 598 (1975).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1965). A three-judge district court is required even
if the constitutional attack is upon the statute only as applied and, normally, even if
the decision is to dismiss under Younger since an exercise of discretion ordinarily will
be required. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 457 n.7 (1974). See generally C.
WuGrr, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 47-51 (2d ed. 1970).
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adjudged obscene.' On appeal" a divided United States Supreme
Court,"1 noting that the lower court had not indicated that it had
considered abstention under Younger v. Harris,12 reversed and re-
manded the case for reconsideration in light of the standards estab-
lished in Younger.
13
Younger contains two key propositions: first, that a federal
court should not enjoin a pending 14 state criminal proceeding "except
in very unusual situations, where necessary to prevent immediate,
irreparable injury;"'" and second, that only in extraordinary situa-
tions, such as bad faith prosecution intended to harass a defendant,
can such injury be shown.' 6
9. Pursue, Ltd. v. Huffman, No. C 72-432 (N.D. Ohio, Apr. 20, 1973). For a
discussion of injunctions interfering with freedom of expression, see Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Burnside v. Byers, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1966) allows a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from
permanent injunctions issued by three-judge district courts.
11. The Court split six-three with Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall
dissenting.
12. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
13. In the same term the Court decided three companion cases to Younger:
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971);
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS §§ 47-51 (2d ed. 1970).
14. In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974), the Court declared,
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal
complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal
proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system; nor can fed-
eral intervention, in that circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting nega-
tively upon the state court's ability to enforce Constitutional principles. In
addition, while a pending state prosecution provides the federal plaintiff
with a concrete opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights, a refusal
on the part of the federal courts to intervene when no state proceeding is
pending may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally
flouting state law and the Charybdis of foregoing what he believes to be con-
stitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a
criminal proceeding.
Recently in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), the Court held Younger
applicable when a state criminal action was initiated after a federal complaint was
filed, but before any proceeding of substance on the merits took place in federal court.
Younger also has been made applicable to the military justice system. Schlesinger v.
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
15. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69 (1971). Under any circumstances
irreparable injury and inadequacy of remedies at law are prerequisites for injunctive
relief. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966). In the absence of
bad faith prosecution, a defendant charged under an unconstitutional statute normally
will have an adequate remedy at law by raising his constitutional defense in the state
proceedings. See note 19 and accompanying text inIra.
16. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971). Prior to Huffman it had been
doubted that courts would ever find such circumstances without bad faith prosecution.
See Comment, Protecting Civil Liberties Through Federal Court Intervention in State
Criminal Matters, 59 CALIF. L. Rav. 1549, 1565-66 (1971).
In Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 244 (1926), the Court said that
[t]he accused should first set up and rely upon his defense in the state
courts, even though this involves a challenge of the validity of some statute,
unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate protec-
tion. The Judicial Code provides ample opportunity for ultimate review in
respect of federal questions. An intolerable condition would arise if, when-
ever about to be charged with violating a state law, one were permitted
freely to contest its validity by an original proceeding in some federal court.
See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
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Prior to Huffman the holding and rationale of Younger had
been thought to apply only to criminal prosecutions.' 7 The rationale
for exercising federal restraint in enjoining state criminal actions is
derived from principles of "equity, comity and federalism."'" The
distinction between civil and criminal actions, examined in the con-
curring opinion of Justices Stewart and Harlan in Younger, has been
based upon notions that equity courts are less reluctant to intervene in
civil proceedings and that interference with a civil suit is less offensive
to state interests because the state is not a party.' 9
The Huffman Court went to great pains to avoid outright repu-
diation of this civil-criminal distinction. The Ohio nuisance proceed-
ing was described as "more akin to a criminal prosecution than are
most civil cases." 20 The Court noted that the civil action in question
was closely related to Ohio's criminal statutes prohibiting dissemina-
tion of obscene materials. Federal intervention, therefore, would dis-
rupt the state's efforts to protect the very interests that underlie its
criminal laws. 2'
17. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460 (1974).
18. Id. Comity and federalism, used in this context, are virtually synonymous.
In Younger the Court defined them as
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments and a contin-
uance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
These concepts and policies are embodied in the anti-injunction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (1965), which reads,
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay pro-
ceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments.
Section 2283 is not a flexible doctrine of comity. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Locom. Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970). It is "an absolute ban upon the
issuance of a federal injunction against pending state court proceedings in the absence
of one of the recognized exceptions." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 228-29
(1972); see note 6 supra.
Not all commentators, however, agree that federalism is important when funda-
mental rights are involved. Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the
First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 740 (1974).
19. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 55 (1971) (Stewart & Harlan, JJ.,
concurring). In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460 (1974), the Court was
cognizant that a pending state proceeding, in all but unusual cases, would
provide the federal plaintiff with the necessary vehicle for vindicating his
constitutional rights, and, in the circumstance, the restraining of an ongoing
prosecution would entail an unseemly failure to give effect to the principle
that state courts have the solemn responsibility, equally with the federal
courts 'to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the
Constitution of the United States. . . .' (citation omitted).
20. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
21. Id. at 604-05.
Nevertheless, the state action against Pursue was a true civil
proceeding. The Fifth Circuit, faced with similar facts in Palaio v.
McAuliffe,2" distinguished civil and criminal actions on the ground
that a civil proceeding does
not subject [defendants] to any risk of fine or imprisonment;
as far -as they [are] concerned, the worst possible outcome of
the suit could be seizure of the films and the consequent eco-
nomic loss. . . . In the sense that no 'penalty' could arise from
the state proceeding as such then, it was surely 'civil' in nature. 23
Consequently, Huffman stands out as the first case in which the
Supreme Court explicitly has applied the Younger principles to a civil
proceeding.
It is unclear how far the Court ultimately will extend Huffman,
if at all, or how it will be interpreted and applied by lower courts.
Despite the Court's disclaimer that "[f]or the purposes of [Huffman]
we need make no general pronouncements upon the applicability of
Younger to all civil litigation, '24 the opinion has language suggesting
that federal restraint may be appropriate in any state proceeding, civil
or criminal, depending upon the circumstances of the case.25 This
language, emphasizing the capability of state appellate courts to rule
adequately and fairly on federal constitutional issues, may be the
foundation of a future Supreme Court decision totally abolishing the
civil-criminal distinction set forth in Younger.
The Seventh Circuit anticipated the Huffman holding in Cousins
v. Wigoda.26 Cousins arose from a state court challenge to the creden-
tials of elected delegates to the 1972 Democratic presidential conven-
tion. Defendants sought to enjoin action in the Illinois court on the
ground that it would have a "chilling effect"2 7 upon their first amend-
ment rights. The federal court of appeals declined to exercise jurisdic-
tion, however, holding that the principles announced in Younger
controlled. The court emphasized that Younger demanded greater
respect for state courts than would be demonstrated if their civil or
criminal proceedings could be enjoined on the mere possibility of
error. 8 Other courts of appeals, however, have applied Younger only
22. 466 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1972).
23. Id. at 1232.
24. 420 U.S. at 607. The Huffman decision was followed on very similar facts
in Marks v. Leis, 420 U.S. 940 (1975).
25. Presumably application of the Huffman principles, as with those of Youn-
ger, will have to "always be considered by federal judges in the course of determining
whether or not to exercise jurisdiction to restrain state courts . Lynch v. Snepp,
472 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1973); see notes 6 and 18 supra.
26. 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1972).
27. In a shift from the Court's position in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965), the Younger Court held that the possibility of a chilling effect on first
amendment rights would not alone justify federal intervention. Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 50-52 (1971).
28. 463 F.2d at 608.
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when the state civil action was related directly to that state's criminal
statutes. For example, in Palaio v. McAuliffe29 the court found the
state proceedings to be "part of Georgia's program of enforcing its
criminal laws."8 0
Cousins and Palaio illustrate alternative approaches available to
courts in interpreting and applying Huffman. They can give it a broad
interpretation and apply it to all civil proceedings or they can inter-
pret it narrowly, limiting it to its facts and applying it only to civil
suits quasi-criminal in nature.3'
On balance, a broad interpretation of Huffman is more persua-
sive. The concepts of equity, comity, and federalism3 2 that underlie
the proposition that state courts are in no sense inferior to federal
courts33 occupy too important a place in our history34 and our future
to turn upon the labels "civil" and "criminal. '3 5  Instead, courts
should adopt a case-by-case approach, 3  analyzing in light of
Younger 7 the unique balance of competing interests that each case38
presents.
29. 466 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1972); see note 22 and accompanying text supra.
30. 466 F.2d at 1233. A similar case is Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244 (5th Cir.
1973); see Evans Theatre Corp. v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 377, 180 S.E.2d 712 (1971).
31. The dissent in Huffman illustrates the currently transitory nature of the
law. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, felt that treating a
civil proceeding as one "in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes" was the first
step toward applying Younger to all civil cases. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.
592, 613 (1975).
The dissenters also feared that Huffman would strip a civil defendant of federal
protection of his constitutional rights. Unlike a criminal case, in which steps prior to
actual prosecution, such as coroner's inquests and grand jury proceedings, afford some
protection from harassing prosecutions, a civil proceeding is started merely by filing a
complaint. Id. at 614-16. The dissent's position is questionable.
I am not impressed by the assertion that some valuable right which will be
given to him in the federal court will be taken away from him . . . in the
state court. As I understand the jurisprudence of this state, it operates with
an eye to justice, just the same as that of the federal court.
Pabst v. Roxana Petro. Co., 30 F.2d 953, 954 (S.D. Tex. 1929). The idea that federal
courts afford superior protection for constitutional rights is not new. See Boatmen's
Bank v. Fritzlen, 135 F. 650, 653-55 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 198 U.S. 586 (1905);
Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present and Future, 43 TEXAS L.
REv. 1 (1964).
32. See notes 17 and 18 and accompanying text supra.
33. Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1973).
34. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 8
(1939).
35. Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1973); Palaio v. McAuliffe,
466 F.2d 1230, 1232 (5th Cir. 1972).
36. Palaio v. McAuliffe, 466 F.2d 1230, 1232-33 (5th Cir. 1972).
37. See notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
38. See Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769,
775 (4th Cir. 1973).
[Casenote by Larry I. Haft.]
WILLS-CHARITABLE BEQUESTS AND DEVISES-PENNSYLVANIA'S
MORTMAIN STATUTE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Cavill
Estate, - Pa. -, 329 A.2d 503 (1974); Riley Estate, -
Pa. -, 329 A.2d 511 (1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975).
In two recent cases, Cavill Estate1 and Riley Estate,' the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania struck down section 7(1) of the Wills
Act of 19473 as violative of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. This section, commonly called the Pennsylvania
Mortmain Statute, invalidated testamentary dispositions of property
for charitable or religious purposes if the testator died within thirty
days of execution of the original will or codicil that made the be-
quest.' In both Cavill and Riley the attempted gifts for religious
or charitable purposes would have been invalid if section 7(1) were
constitutional.
The orphans' court in Cavill held that the mortmain statute vio-
lated the privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protec-
tion clauses of the fourteenth amendment." In Riley the lower court
originally upheld the statute, but later granted reargument based on
Small's Estate,6 a 1972 District of Columbia decision. After reargu-
ment the court invalidated section 7(1), reasoning that it infringed
on the freedom of religion guaranteed by the first amendment.7  On
appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sustained both lower
1. Cavill Estate, - Pa. -, 329 A.2d 503 (1974).
2. Riley Estate, - Pa. -, 329 A.2d 511 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971
(1975).
3. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L 89, No. 38, § 7(1) (formerly PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 180.7(1) (1950) ). This section is now § 2507(1) of title 20 (Decedents,
Estates and Fiduciaries) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, 20 PA.C.S. §
2507(1). The Cavill majority stated that its decision was equally applicable to the
new section. - Pa. at - n.1, 329 A.2d at 504 n.1.
4. The section read in part,
Any bequest or devise for religious or charitable purposes included in a will
or codicil executed within thirty days of death of the testator shall be in-
valid unless all who would benefit by its invalidity agree that it shall be
valid ....
5. Cavill's Estate, 56 Erie 44 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1973).
6. No. - (D.D.C., Feb. 7, 1972), reported in 40 U.S.L.W. 2547 (Feb. 22,
1972). In this case the court held that a District of Columbia statute that required
a testator to survive thirty days after execution of his will to validate a testamentary
gift to a religious leader or public teacher violated the first amendment because it
singled out religion for particular treatment without any justification or compelling
government necessity. There was no discussion of the first amendment's establish-
ment or free exercise clause. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
7. Riley's Estate, No. 220 (Orphans' Ct., Blair County, Pa., June 11, 1973).
See generally Hutton, The Execution of Wills, 47 DICK. L. REv. 65 (1943).
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court decisions, but based its decision solely on the equal protection
clause."
Mortmain statutes are common in the United States.9 Pennsyl-
vania's has been in effect since 1855;1o during this time a substantial
number of charitable bequests and devises have been voided. Until
Cavill and Riley, however, no direct challenge to the constitutionality
of the statute had been made." Moreover, the highest courts of two
other states had held that similar statutes did not violate the four-
teenth amendment.' 2 Although the validity of mortmain statutes
has not been challenged until recently, the wisdom of the policy un-
derlying them has often been criticized. In a report the American
Bar Association's Committee on Succession remarked,
[The] general laws [of succession] effectively protect the testa-
tor and his immediate family from overreaching by a charitable
solicitor or an unreasoned charitable gift and . . . they preserve
a portion of the testator's estate for at least his spouse and
perhaps his minor children. . . . Modern policies . . . do not
seem to suggest that testators need more protection against char-
ities than against greedy relatives.
13
8. The court stated that this result also was mandated by the prohibition
against special laws in the Pennsylvania constitution. PA. CONST. art. III, § 32.
In determining whether art. HI, § 32 has been violated, the tests are the same as
those applied in federal courts for violations of the equal protection clause. Bargain
City U.S.A. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 133, 179 A.2d 439, 442 (1962). Classifica-
tions are not prohibited as long as they are reasonable and founded on a general
distinction. Smith's Application, 381 Pa. 223, 233, 112 A.2d 625, 631 (1955); Howe
v. Smith, 203 Pa. Super. 212, 220, 199 A.2d 521, 524 (1964).
9. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 40-43 (West 1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.
803 (Spec. Pamphlet 1975) (six months); GA. CODE § 113-107 (1975) (ninety
days); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-142 (1948) (thirty days if over one-third of
estate); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.06 (six months if over 25% .of estate).
10. Act of April 26, 1855, P.L. 328, No. 347, § 11; see Act of June 7, 1911,
P.L. 702, No. 277, § 1; Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 403, No. 190, § 6.
11. In fact, in Rhymer's Appeal, 93 Pa. 142 (1880), the court noted that "it
has never been doubted that [the Mortmain Statute of 1855] is constitutional." id.
at 146. But see O'Brien & O'Brien, Pennsylvania's Wills Act of 1947 and Separation
of Church and State, 52 DIcK. L. REV. 79 (1948). In this article the authors con-
tended that under certain circumstances, not present in Cavill or Riley, § 7(1) vio-
lated the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of religion. (E.g., bequests by
Jehovah's Witnesses for support of their ministers or for sermons of distribution and
by Catholics for the saying of Masses). See also O'Brien & O'Brien, Why Pennsyl-
vania Restricts Gifts for Masses, 48 DIcK. L. REV. 179 (1944); Small's Estate, No.
- (D.D.C., Feb. 7, 1972), reported in 40 U.S.L.W. 2547 (Feb. 22, 1972).
12. Taylor v. Paine, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615, appeal dismissed, 323 U.S.
666 (1944); Decker v. American Univ., 236 Iowa 895, 20 N.W.2d 466 (1945).
13. ABA Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section, Committee on Suc-
cession, Restrictions on Charitable Testamentary Gifts, 5 REAL PROP., PROB. AND
TRusT J. 290, 298 (1970) (emphasis added).
This type of criticism led to legislative changes 14 and judicial inter-
pretations 5 aimed at ameliorating the harshness of the thirty-day
survivorship requirement. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's
decision in Flood v. Ryan'6 led one commentator 7 to question
whether the mortmain section of the Wills Act of 1917, analogous
to the section challenged in Cavill and Riley, retained any vitality.
In that case the court invalidated a gift to a charity because it was
made within thirty days of the testator's death, but sustained an alter-
native personal bequest to the Archbishop of Philadelphia, whom the
testator had never met, even though it was a sham intended solely
to circumvent the statute.'" Thus, even before Cavill and Riley,
Pennsylvania's mortmain statute was of dubious vitality.
In striking down the mortmain statute, the supreme court rea-
soned that the statute divided testators into two classes: those who
provided in their wills for charitable or religious gifts, but died within
the thirty-day period; and those who either made no such gifts or
did and survived the thirty-day period. Gifts by persons in the first
class were voidable at the election of any person who would benefit
by their invalidity. In holding this classification unreasonable, the
court argued that it voided charitable gifts made by healthy persons
who died unexpectedly within thirty days of making the gift, while
it sustained gifts by terminally ill testators who survived the statutory
period. Furthermore, although its purpose was to protect a testator's
family from gifts improvidently made during a last illness,19 the stat-
14. In O'Brien's Estate, 23 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 330, 335 (Orphans' Ct. Phila.
1973), Judge Palwelec wrote,
Eventually, society came to realize that gifts to charity or church which
were made within the last thirty days of a man's life were not always unduly
influenced by charity or church, and that the law was unfair to the testator,
the charity, and the church, in many instances. Therefore, the legislature
decided that the law should be modified and liberalized ...
Examples of legislative modification include granting beneficiaries the power to waive
their right to void the gifts and excepting the gift from the thirty-day rule if the
testator had made a substantially similar gift in a prior will that was revoked by
the last will made within thirty days before death. 20 PA.C.S. § 2507(1).
15. See, e.g., Smith Estate, 435 Pa. 258, 256 A.2d 130 (1969); Baum Es-
tate, 418 Pa. 404, 211 A.2d 521 (1965) (carbon copy of a prior will was held a
sufficient original within the meaning of the exception to the thirty-day period);
Gredler's Estate, 63 York 151 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1948) (a charitable devise was
held valid even though it fell within the thirty-day period because it was made pursu-
ant to an oral agreement between husband and wife prior to their deaths).
16. 220 Pa. 450, 69 A. 908 (1908).
17. Hutton, The Execution of Wills, 47 DICK. L. REv. 65, 86 (1943).
18. 220 Pa. at 460, 69 A. at 911; see Bickley's Estate, 270 Pa. 101, 113 A.
68 (1921); Schultz's Appeal, 80 Pa. 396 (1876); cf. Gilbert's Estate, 5 Pa. Fiduc.
Rep. 47 (Orphans' Ct. Lack. 1954) (found Flood v. Ryan to be applicable to the
Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 89, No. 38, § 7(1) ).
19. The purpose of § 7(1) was to
prevent a testator during his last illness from being importuned, or other-
wise influenced, by hope of reward or fear of punishment in the hereafter,
to leave his estate . . . to charity or to church . . . [because of the difficul-
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ute contained no requirement of an immediate family that would
benefit from the voided gift. Thus, the court concluded, in one
sense the statute was underinclusive, and in another overinclusive.
Having characterized the classification as arbitrary, the court rea-
soned that "[tiherefore, the Equal Protection Clause forbids us to
give it any effect."20
In a dissenting opinion Justice Pomeroy argued that the court
should have considered two preliminary issues before reaching the
question of whether the statutory classification created by the mort-
main statute bore a rational relation to the objective of the legisla-
tion: first, whether the fourteenth amendment applied to the subject
matter of this legislation; and second, whether the mortmain statute
created a classificational scheme requiring application of the rational
relation test.2  By ignoring the first issue, the majority implicitly
held that there is a constitutionally protected right to inherit. 22  In
so doing they ignored precedents of considerable authority. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Burnison23 the Supreme Court upheld a
California statute that excluded the United States from a list of per-
missible beneficiaries of testamentary gifts. The Court held that de-
terminations about the manner of testamentary disposition, as well
as the exclusion of potential beneficiaries, were powers retained by
the states under the tenth amendment. 24  The Pennsylvania case of
Tack's Estate2 5 further supports this principle. In holding that cer-
tain bonds of the Delaware River Bridge Joint Commission were sub-
ject to Pennsylvania inheritance tax, the court noted,
The right to transmit or to receive property by will or through in-
testacy is not a natural right, but a creature of the statutory
grant. Students of the law agree that the state has the right to
declare an escheat of all the property of a decedent, and there-
fore, as the price of allowing a legatee, devisee or heir to inherit,
it may appropriate to itself any portion of the property which it
chooses to exact. 28
ties in proving] . . . whether a man was in his last illness, or whether he
had been importuned, or was unduly influenced ....
McGuigen Estate, 388 Pa. 475, 478, 131 A.2d 124, 126 (1957).
20. Cavill Estate, - Pa. -, -, 329 A.2d 503, 506 (1974).
21. Id. at -, 329 A.2d at 507 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
22. See Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906) (as a mat-
ter of state constitutional law the right to take property by will or inheritance is
protected as a natural right that cannot be wholly taken away or substantially im-
paired by the legislature).
23. 339 U.S. 87 (1949).
24. Id. at 91-93.
25. 325 Pa. 545, 191 A. 155 (1937).
26. Id. at 548, 191 A. at 156.
Since the right to transmit property at death is a creature of statute,
it is possible for a state to prohibit testamentary transfers for charit-
able or religious purposes. These transfers are not protected by the
Constitution.17  If a state can totally prohibit a charitable transfer,
it is anomalous that a state cannot impose the lesser burden on testa-
tors and charitable beneficiaries of requiring a thirty-day survivorship
as a condition for testamentary transmittal of charitable gifts.
28
In his dissent Justice Pomeroy also argued that whether or not
the fourteenth amendment applied, the statute in question did not
create any classification. It simply imposed a condition similar to
other requirements that must be satisfied for a will to be valid. 29  A
testator's will can be modified in numerous ways by operation of law
regardless of his actual intentions.3" That one of these conditions
can be molded into a classification is not constitutionally significant.
The recent Supreme Court decision of Labine v. Vincents"
lends considerable support to both arguments of the dissent. After
review of the Louisiana intestate laws, which prohibited illegitimate
children from inheriting equally from their natural parents, the Court
doubted whether a statutory classification, in fact, had been created.
Moreover, although admitting that these laws discriminated against
illegitimates, the Court recognized that absent a specific constitu-
tional guarantee, the power to promulgate discriminatory rules was
properly exercisable by the state legislature.3 2
Assuming that the fourteenth amendment is applicable and that
section 7(1) creates a statutory classification, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania would agree unanimously that the proper test is
whether the classification is "reasonable, not arbitrary, and rests on
27. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Taylor v. Paine, 154 Fla.
359, 17 So. 2d 615, appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 666 (1944).
28. In Taylor v. Paine, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615, 617, appeal dismissed,
323 U.S. 666 (1944), the Florida court upheld a similar statute that invalidated char-
itable gifts in wills executed within six months of death if the testator was survived
by a spouse or issue. The court stated that the right of testamentary disposition
was not protected by the Constitution and, therefore, a state may limit disposition
to a particular class or establish a time period that must elapse after a will's execu-
tion before a gift to a particular class will be deemed valid.
29. Cavil Estate, - Pa. , , 329 A.2d 503, 507 (1974) (Pomeroy, J.,
dissenting).
30. See, e.g., Verner Estate, 358 Pa. 280, 56 A.2d 667 (1948). In that case
the brother of the testatrix was permitted to take his intestate share of the portion
of the estate not covered by the will even though it was obvious that the testatrix
had intended to limit him to a $5 nominal gift. In Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314
U.S. 556 (1942), testator's wife had denounced all her rights in his estate pursuant
to an antenuptial agreement. Subsequent to the agreement, however, the legislature
created a mandatory right of election against a spouse's will. Testator's later execu-
tion of a codicil made the statute operative to the entire will and invalidated her
waiver.
31. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
32. Id. at 538.
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some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation.1 33  To support its conclusion that the
classification failed this test, the majority cited three cases, Eisenstadt
v. Baird,34 Reed v. Reed,s5 and Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia.6
Upon examination, however, these cases do not provide cogent au-
thority for striking down the Pennsylvania statute. The mortmain
classification is neither arbitrary to the degree required in Reed a7
and Royster Guano3 s nor violative of a fundamental right as in Eisen-
stadt.
39
The effect of a mortmain statute is to distribute a testator's
property in direct contradiction to his expressed desires. Generally
a void gift will be transmitted through the residuary clause of the
testator's will or, if the deceased died partially intestate, it may be
transmitted to unknown collateral heirs. The majority's final argu-
ment-that section 7(1) created an unreasonable classification be-
cause the statute invalidated gifts when there was no immediate fam-
33. Cavill Estate, - Pa. -, -, 329 A.2d 503, 505 (1974). In construing
the equal protection clause, the United States Supreme Court has developed two basic
tests. Statutes involving fundamental rights or suspect classifications are strictly
scrutinized and generally the government must demonstrate a compelling interest ne-
cessitating the classification. The following cases were held to involve fundamental
rights: Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elec., 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate). Cases involving suspect classifications include
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (illegitimacy); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (poverty); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)
(nationality). When a statutory classification does not involve either a suspect class-
ification or a fundamental right, the government need only show that the statute
is not patently arbitrary and that it has some fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
34. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
35. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
36. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
37. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), an Idaho statute provided for prefer-
ence of males over females when competing claims existed for the administration
of an estate. Although the elimination of controversy was a legitimate purpose, the
statute was struck down since the preference had no reasonable basis and was pa-
tently arbitrary. Id. at 76-77.
38. In Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920), a statute imposed
income taxes on out-of-state operations of Virginia-chartered corporations that did
business within Virginia, but exempted Virginia-chartered corporations that con-
ducted all business outside of the state. After holding that raising revenues from
chartering corporations was not a legitimate purpose, the court invalidated the statute
because corporations in the former class obtained no more protection for out-of-state
operations and were subject to the same foreign taxes as corporations in the latter
category. Therefore, the scheme was patently arbitrary. Id. at 416-17.
39. 405 U.S. at 453-54 (implying a fundamental right of privacy).
ily to protect 4°-understated the statute's purpose. The obvious leg-
islative purpose was to protect those who would otherwise receive
the estate.4 ' Therefore, the presence or absence of an immediate
family is irrelevant. When a gift voided by the mortmain statute is
distributed to residuary legatees or intestate heirs, it is given in the
former case to a person whom the testator intended to benefit, al-
though admittedly to a lesser extent. In the latter case it is given
to one whom the law presumes the testator intended to benefit.42
In either case the purpose of the statute is fulfilled.
The Pennsylvania Mortmain Statute was undoubtedly in need
of revision and perhaps abolition, particularly after judicial interpre-
tations permitting a testator on his death bed to avoid the statute with
relative ease. 43 This was a matter for legislative action, however,
and the Cavill and Riley decisions establish unfortunate precedent.
TORTS--Res Ipsa Loquitur-SECTION 328D OF THE RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS ADOPTED, ExCLUSIVE CONTROL DOCTRINE
ABROGATED. Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 327 A.2d
94 (1974).
The confusion surrounding the principles of res ipsa loquitur
and exclusive control, which has plagued not only academicians, but
also the practicing bar,' was ended by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania in Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc.2 The court expressly adopted
section 328D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, abrogating the
exclusive control doctrine and limiting the procedural effect of res
ipsa loquitur to a permissible inference. In essence, res ipsa loquitur
now operates only as a rule of circumstantial evidence.
The case against Korvette's and Otis Elevator Company origi-
nated as an action for personal injuries sustained by three-year-old
40. Cavill Estate, - Pa. -, -, 329 A.2d 503, 506 (1974).
41. Even the majority, citing 3 G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 326, at
883 (2d ed. 1964), recognizes that the statute's purpose was to protect near relatives,
not merely the immediate family. - Pa. at -, 329 A.2d at 505.
42. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
43. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
[Casenote by J. Michael Ewing].
1. See Farage & McDaid, Annual Survey of Pennsylvania Legal Develop-
ments: Tort Law, 45 PA. B. AsS'N Q. 247, 264 (1974): "Pennsylvania lawyers and
judges are still swamped in the morass of technicalities which distinguish res ipsa
loquitur and exclusive control."
2. 457 Pa. 602, 327 A.2d 94 (1974).
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Creston Gilbert while riding an Otis escalator with his grandfather
and sister in a Korvette's department store. At the bottom of the
escalator Creston attempted to alight, but his foot became caught in
the step and was pulled into the comb plate. The accident caused a
loss of part of the child's left great toe and a general disfiguration of
the foot.
The trial judge instructed the jury that if they found that both
defendants had exercised joint exclusive control of the escalator, a
verdict could be returned against them on the theory of res'ipsa
loquitur8 The jury returned a verdict of forty thousand dollars.4 The
superior court,5 implementing the traditional Pennsylvania approach,
found that res ipsa loquitur was applied properly to Korvette's and
affirmed that portion of the judgment. The court ruled, however, that
res ipsa loquitur did not apply to Otis and granted Otis a new trial.
The supreme court allowed Korvette's appeal, but limited it to wheth-
er the case against Otis was properly submitted to the jury on the
theory of res ipsa loquitur. In an opinion by Justice Roberts the
supreme court affirmed the superior court's order, but on the ground
that the trial court had erroneously charged the jury on the proce-
dural effect of res ipsa loquitur. The court refused to continue the
confusion surrounding exclusive control and res ipsa loquitur and
overruled years of precedent by holding the latter applicable to both
defendants.
Under Pennsylvania precedent abandoned in Gilbert, res ipsa
loquitur would have been applied only to Korvette's. To invoke the
discarded rule three requirements had to coexist: (a) defendant had
to owe plaintiff a duty of the highest degree of care; (b) the instru-
mentality that caused the accident had to be in defendant's exclusive
control; and (c) the accident ordinarily would not have occurred if
defendant had exercised the highest degree of care.6 Korvette's, con-
3. Otis Elevator Company had manufactured, installed, and contracted to
service the escalator on a weekly basis. Korvette's was responsible for day-to-day
matters such as cleaning, starting and stopping, and checking the escalator's proper
operation.
4. Thirty-five thousand dollars of the verdict went to the minor plaintiff, the
balance to his parents.
5. Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc., 223 Pa. Super. 359, 299 A.2d 356 (1972). Judge
Packel in a concurring and dissenting opinion argued that res ipsa loquitur was
applicable to both defendants. Id. at 372, 299 A.2d at 363.
6. E.g., Alexander v. Nanticoke Light Co., 209 Pa. 571, 58 A. 1068 (1904);
East End Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Torpedo Co., 190 Pa. 350, 42 A. 707 (1899);
Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc., 223 Pa. Super. 359, 299 A.2d 356 (1972).
sidered a common carrier because of its ownership and operation of
the escalator,7 owed plaintiff the highest degree of care. Otis, on the
other hand, owed plaintiff only ordinary care because of its service
contract with Korvette's.8 Therefore, only the exclusive control doc-
trine, and not res ipsa loquitur, might have been used against Otis
under the earlier approach.9
Generally, when plaintiff had established a res ipsa ease, a
presumption of negligence resulted. In Pennsylvania, however, this
presumption shifted the ultimate burden of proof to defendant: 10 he
had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had exer-
7. Petrie v. Kaufmann & Baer Co., 291 Pa. 211, 139 A. 878 (1927); see
McKnight v. S.S. Kresge Co., 285 Pa. 489, 132 A. 575 (1926) (holding one owning
and operating an elevator to be a common carrier).
8. Evans v. Otis Elevator Co., 403 Pa. 13, 168 A.2d 573 (1961). In a situation
similar to the case under discussion, the court stated,
Generally a party to a contract does not become liable for a breach thereof
to one who is not a party thereto. However, a party to a contract by the
very nature of his contractual undertaking may place himself in such a posi-
tion that the law will impose upon him a duty to perform his contractual
undertaking in such a manner that third persons-strangers to the contract
-will not be injured thereby; . . . It is not the contract per se which cre-
ates the duty; it is the law which imposes the duty because of the nature
of the undertaking in the contract.
Id. at 18, 168 A.2d at 575. See also Bollin v. Elevator Constr. & Repair Co., 361 Pa.
7, 63 A.2d 19 (1949); Johnson v. Otis Elevator Co., 225 Pa. Super. 500, 311 A.2d
656 (1973); W. PROSS R, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 93, at 622 (4th ed.
1971 ) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
9. By the requirement that defendant owe plaintiff the highest degree of care,
Pennsylvania had limited the availability of res ipsa loquitur. Included in this class of
defendants were owners and operators of common carriers, Ambrose v. Western Md.
Ry., 368 Pa. 1, 81 A.2d 895 (1951), elevators, McKnight v. S.S. Kresge Co., 285 Pa.
489, 132 A. 575 (1926), and escalators, Petrie v. Kaufmann & Baer Co., 291 Pa. 211,
139 A. 878 (1927), as well as suppliers of electrical power, Alexander v. Nanticoke
Light Co., 209 Pa. 571, 58 A. 1068 (1904).
Ostensibly prompted by the limited availability of res ipsa loquitur, Pennsylvania
recognized "a unique sibling doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, 'exclusive control'." Gilbert
v. Korvette's Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 608 & n.16, 327 A.2d 94, 98 & n.16 (1974). The
requirements for application of this principle, however, severely limited availability of
this theory as well. The elements were stated by Chief Justice Bell in Izzi v.
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 412 Pa. 559, 566, 195 A.2d 784, 788 (1963):
The doctrine [of exclusive control] should be applied only where all of the
following elements are present: (a) where the thing which caused the acci-
dent is under the exclusive control of or was made or manufactured by the
defendant; and (b) the accident or injury would ordinarily not happen if
the defendant exercised due care, or made or manufactured the article with
due care; and (c) where the evidence of the cause of the injury or accident
is not equally available to both parties, but is exclusively accessible to and
within the possession of the defendant; and (d) the accident itself is very
unusual or exceptional and the likelihood of harm to plaintiff or one of his
class could reasonably have been foreseen and prevented by the exercise of
due care; and (e) the general principles of negligence have not theretofore
been applied to such facts. (emphasis in original).
The Gilbert court referred to these requirements as arbitrary and noted that they
recently had received judicial criticism. Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 608-09
& n.18, 327 A.2d 94, 98 & n.18 (1974); see Miller v. Delaware County Mem. Hosp.,
428 Pa. 504, 509, 239 A.2d 340, 342 (1968) (Musmanno, J., dissenting); Banet v.
Philadelphia, 226 Pa. Super. 452, 457, 313 A.2d 253, 256 (1973).
10. Some authorities refer to this burden as the risk of nonpersuasion. E.g., 9 J.




cised the highest degree of care" or suffer an adverse verdict.' 2 To
the contrary, however, is a 1944 supreme court case involving what
appeared to be res ipsa loquitur.'8 Although the court's reasoning was
confusing, it indicated that res ipsa loquitur produced only a pre-
sumption as most authorities defined it:' 4 a shifting of the burden of
11. E.g., Norris v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 334 Pa. 161, 5 A.2d 114 (1939);
Lineaweaver v. Wanamaker, 299 Pa. 45, 149 A. 91 (1930); Petrie v. Kaufmann &
Baer Co., 291 Pa. 211, 139 A. 878 (1927); McKnight v. S.S. Kresge Co., 285 Pa.
489, 132 A.2d 575 (1926); Shaughnessy v. Director Gen. of Railroads, 274 Pa. 413,
118 A. 390 (1922); Doud v. Hines, 269 Pa. 182, 112 A. 528 (1921); Bickley v.
Philadelphia & Reading Ry., 257 Pa. 369, 101 A. 654 (1917); Seeherman v. Wilkes-
Barre Co., 255 Pa. 11, 99 A. 174 (1916); Johns v. Pennsylvania R.R., 226 Pa. 319,
75 A. 408 (1910); Alexander v. Nanticoke Light Co., 209 Pa. 571, 58 A. 1068
(1904); Stearns v. Ontario Spinning Co., 182 Pa. 519, 39 A. 292 (1898); Shafer v.
Lacock, Hawthorn & Co., 168 Pa. 497, 32 A. 44 (1895);Pennsylvania R.R. v.
MacKinney, 124 Pa. 462, 17 A. 14 (1889); Spear v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R., 119
Pa. 61, 12 A. 824 (1888); Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v. Anderson, 94 Pa. 351
(1886); Harp v. Gallagher, 72 Pa. 136 (1872); Sullivan v. Philadelphia & Reading
R.R., 30 Pa. 234 (1858); Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. 479 (1848); see 2 G. HENRY,
PENNSYLVANiA EVIDENCE § 675 (4th ed. 1953); Forrest, Trend of Application of the
Doctrines of Res Ipsa Loquitur and Exclusive Control in Pennsylvania, 58 DICK. L.
REV. 363, 367 (1954); Gettys, The Res Ipsa Loquitur Rule as Applied in Pennsyl-
vania, 11 TEMP. L.Q. 191, 209 (1937); Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa
Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REv. 241, 250 (1936); Roberts, An Introduction to the Study
of Presumptions, 4 VILL. L. REv. 1, 13 (1958); Note, The Effect of Rebuttable Pre-
sumptions in Pennsylvania, 57 DICK. L. REV. 234, 240 (1953); Note, Res Ipsa Loqui-
tur Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 212, 214 (1936); Note, Res Ipsa
Loquitur and Exclusive Control in Pennsylvania, 15 U. Prrr. L. REV. 325, 327
(1954); 51 DICK. L. REV. 129, 130-31 (1946).
12. This procedural effect, Prosser argued, resulted from confusing the principle
of res ipsa loquitur with another area of the law.
[Res ipsa loquituri . . . became involved . . . in cases of injuries to pas-
sengers at the hands of carriers, with the aftermath of an older decision
which had held that the carrier had the burden of proving that it had not
been negligent. The two principles, one concerned with the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence, the other of the burden of proof, gradually became
confused and intermingled; and from this fusion there developed an uncer-
tain 'doctrine' of res ipsa loquitur ....
PROSsER, supra note 8, § 39, at 213. Justice Roberts agreed with this explanation.
Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 605-06, 327 A.2d 94, 97 (1974).
13. MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 36 A.2d 492 (1944).
Although the court never used the term "res ipsa loquitur," the facts of the case made
the principle applicable. Additionally, plaintiff showed only that she and her deceased
child were passengers on defendant's train, that a derailment had occurred, and that
the child was killed. Plaintiff made no attempt to prove specific negligence. Several
commentators have referred to the case as one involving res ipsa loquitur. Forrest,
Trend of Application of the Doctrines of Res Ipsa Loquitur and Exclusive Control
in Pennsylvania, 58 DICK. L. REV. 363, 367 n.10 (1954); Roberts, An Introduction
to the Study of Presumptions, 4 ViLL. L. REV. 1, 23-25 (1958); Note, The Effect
of Rebuttable Presumptions in Pennsylvania, 57 DICK. L. REV. 234, 243 (1953).
14. The relevant language of the case is as follows:
In the instant case, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff. When plain-
tiff proved that her son while a passenger on defendant's train was killed
by the derailment of that train she met the burden of proof initially resting
upon her, and if no further evidence had been offered by either side, the
jury should have returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, because upon proof
going forward with the evidence so that defendant's failure to pro-
duce any evidence requires the trier of fact to find for plaintiff.15
Because this inconsistency was never resolved, it is impossible to
state precisely the procedural effect of the res ipsa loquitur presump-
,tion.1
In contrast to the harshness of the res ipsa presumption, exclu-
sive control raised only a permissible inference of defendant's negli-
gence. Once plaintiff made out an exclusive control case, he was able
to avoid a directed verdict. 7 The jury could draw or refuse to draw
the inference. Some decisions, however, stated that exclusive control
"shifts to the defendant the burden of going forward with the
evidence . .. ,,Is Again, careless language used by the courts was
no small source of confusion.
of the facts just stated a 'presumption' arose that the child's death resulted
from the defendant's negligence. This presumption was 'a conclusion based
upon the generally known results of wide human experience.' [citation
omitted]. This presumption cast upon the defendant, if it wished to fore-
stall a verdict in plaintiff's favor, the burden of producing evidence to neu-
tralize the inference which the jury in the absence of countervailing evi-
dence would draw legitimately from the evidence produced by the plaintiff.
MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 566-67, 36 A.2d 492, 496 (1944). The
confusion arose because of the court's earlier citation of Doud v. Hines, 269 Pa. 182,
112 A. 528 (1921). Doud held that the effect of res ipsa loquitur was to shift the
ultimate burden of proof to defendant.
15. 9 WiGMoRE, supra note 10, § 2490, at 287. Prosser, The Procedural Effect
of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REv. 241, 244 (1935-36).
16. The following authorities are of the opinion that the procedural effect of
res ipsa loquitur was not changed in Pennsylvania as a result of MacDonald v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 36 A.2d 492 (1944): 2 G. HENRY, PENNSYLVANIA
EVIDENCE § 675 (4th ed. 1953); Forrest, Trend of Application of the Doctrines of
Res Ipsa Loquitur and Exclusive Control in Pennsylvania, 58 DICK. L. REV. 363, 367
& n.10 (1954); Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Exclusive Control in Pennsylvania, 15
U. PITr. L. REv. 325, 327 (1954); 51 DICK. L. REV. 129, 130-31 (1947).
Some authorities have taken the oppostie position. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 40, at
230 & n.23. Although Prosser listed Pennsylvania as one of the states that gave res
ipsa loquitur the extreme procedural effect of shifting the ultimate burden of proof to
defendant in his first edition, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTS § 44, at
304 & n.46 (1941), his later editions do not include Pennsylvania in this category. See
Roberts, An Introduction to the Study of Presumptions, 4 VILL. L. REV. 1, 25
(1958):
In fact, the MacDonald case with its compromise between the Pennsylvania
and classic rules, taken together with the use of the word 'inference,' is of
more interest as a harbinger of the re-evaluation of res ipsa loquitur than
as any key to the riddle of presumptions.
The final group of authorities are content to take no position, but merely point to
the confusion introduced by the 1944 decision. Levin, Pennsylvania and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence: Presumptions and Dead Man Statutes, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17
n.87 (1954); Note, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions in Pennsylvania, 57 DICK.
L. REV. 234, 242-43 (1953).
17. E.g., Mack v. Reading Co., 377 Pa. 135, 103 A.2d 749 (1954); Gilbert v.
Korvette's Inc., 223 Pa. Super. 359, 299 A.2d 356 (1972); see Meyer, Proof of
Negligence: Exclusive Control and Other Doctrines (An Exercise in Semantics?), 41
TEMP. L.Q. 383, 389 (1968).
18. Ten Ten Chestnut St. Corp. v. Quaker State Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 186
Pa. Super. 585, 593, 142 A.2d 306, 309 (1958); see Izzi v. Philadelphia Transp. Co.,
412 Pa. 559, 195 A.2d 784 (1963), in which Chief Justice Bell stated,
It is well established that the doctrine raises an inference of negligence and
shifts to the defendant the burden of going forward with the evidence, and
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This confusion is now academic. In Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc. the
court abolished the exclusive control doctrine and reduced res ipsa
loquitur to "a simple matter of circumstantial proof . . . [creating]
only a permissible inference of fault 'unless the facts are so com-
pelling that no reasonable man could reject it'."'19 The court chose to
agree with the great majority of American courts20 in abandoning
different procedural effects that had focused "on a formalistic distinc-
tion based on earlier confusion between substantive duty and the
evidentiary worth of offered proof . . *.."I' Justice Roberts ably
analyzed and rejected the notion that differing substantive tort duties
owed by a particular defendant were determinative of both the appli-
cable theory (res ipsa loquitur or exclusive control) and the eviden-
tiary worth (presumption or inference) of offered proof.2" On the
thus takes all such cases to the jury. However, it is rarely ever recognized
that in the last analysis, it also practically and in reality shifts to the de-
fendant the burden of proving due (i.e., reasonable) care and thereby excul-
pating itself from the inference of negligence.
Id. at 566, 195 A.2d at 788 (emphasis in original). The meaning of this quotation is
unclear. For one writer's comments see Sherman, Torts, 1963-64 Survey of Pennsyl-
vania Law, 26 U. Prrr. L. REV. 383, 386 (1964).
19. Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 618, 327 A.2d 94, 103 (1974).
20. PRossER, supra note 8, § 40, at 228.
21. Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 610, 327 A.2d 94, 99 (1974); see
note 12 supra. The permissible inference created by res ipsa loquitur has no
procedural effect.
[Presumptions of fact or inferences] have no significance so far as affects
the duty of one or the other party to produce evidence, because there is no
rule of law attached to them, and the jury may give them whatever force
or weight it thinks best-just as it may to other evidence.
9 WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2490, at 288. The reader should be careful to
differentiate between evidentiary matters such as presumptions and inferences and
procedural matters such as shifting burdens of proof and shifting burdens of going
forward with the evidence.
22. Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 607, 327 A.2d 94, 97 (1974):
However, the considerations in determining -the nature and extent of
substantive tort duty are not necessarily the same as those underlying the
evidentiary use of res ipsa loquitur. Thus, the degree of danger threatened
by a particular activity may, for example, be an important reason for sub.
jecting electric companies to the highest degree of care, but it may have
relatively slight bearing on whether negligence or causation may be inferred
from the circumstances of a particular electrical accident.
The opposing rationale is found in Chief Justice Jones' concurring opinion:
The distinctions which have given rise to two separate doctrines in Penn-
sylvania developed not as a result of confusion by the courts, but from the
recognition that the probative force of the circumstantial evidence is
stronger in cases involving common carriers where the issue is slight negli-
gence than in cases where ordinary negligence is the controlling substantive
standard.
Id. at 621, 327 A.2d at 105. This reasoning, however, disregards the ability of the jury
to make a distinction in drawing the inference from the circumstantial proof offered.
For a commentator in agreement with Chief Justice Jones see Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur
and EXclusive Control in Pennsylvania, 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 325, 330 (1954).
contrary, "[res ipsa loquitur is neither a rule of procedure nor one of
substantive tort law,"2 but is simply a rule of evidence to be used in
circumstantial proof of negligence, unaffected by the degree of tort
duty owed by defendant.
The requirements for invoking the doctrine are found in section
328D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by a plaintiff is
caused by the negligence of the defendant when
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the
plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated
by the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the de-
fendant's duty to the plaintiff.
Of these requirements the most radical departure from Pennsylvania
precedent is the abandonment of defendant's exclusive control of the
instrumentality or activity in question. Defendant's exclusive control
of the instrumentality or activity is now just one way of establishing
his responsibility for the cause of the injury. "Exclusive control may
eliminate other causes, but the critical inquiry is not control but
whether a particular defendant is the responsible cause of the in-
jury."24
To show defendant's responsibility, plaintiff need not eliminate
all other possible causes beyond a reasonable doubt. Although
plaintiff still bears the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that defendant's negligence caused the injury,2 5 he
may do so by making out a case from which the jury may reasonably
conclude that the negligence more probably than not was that of
defendant.2 6 Inherent in this requirement is the necessity of introduc-
ing sufficient evidence to eliminate plaintiff's own conduct as a
responsible cause.
27
23. Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc. 457 Pa. 602, 611, 327 A.2d 94, 99 (1974).
24. Id. at 6, 327 A.2d at 105.
It is not, however, necessary to the inference that the defendant have such
exclusive control; and exclusive control is merely one way of proving his
responsibility. He may be responsible, and the inference may be drawn
against him, where he shares the control with another .... Exclusive
control is merely one fact which establishes the responsibility of the defend-
ant; and if it can be established otherwise, exclusive control is not essential
to a res ipsa loquitur case.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D, comment g (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT].
25. This is what is meant by the common statement in cases holding either res
ipsa loquitur or exclusive control inapplicable: "Ihe law is well settled that the mere
happening of an accident . . . raises no inference or presumption of negligence
.... .E.g., Servast v. Lancaster Yellow Cab & Baggage, Inc., 413 Pa. 250, 251, 196
A.2d 842, 843 (1964).
26. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 328D, comment f; PRossEa, supra note
8, § 39, at 218.
27. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 328D, comment i. It should also be
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Res ipsa loquitur produces a permissible inference of negligence.
The jury must decide whether or not to draw it.28 If the court finds
that the jury could not reasonably draw the inference based on
plaintiff's evidence, a verdict must be directed for defendant.2 9 Simi-
larly, if the court finds the evidence so strong that the jury must draw
the inference, i.e., "so clear that no reasonable man could fail to
accept it,"" ° and if defendant offers no explanation, a verdict must be
directed for plaintiff.
Despite Gilbert a res ipsa defendant has some protection. He
may rebut the inference of negligence by evidence of his own due
care.3 Furthermore, defendant may destroy the inference by showing
that the action is not a res ipsa loquitur case. To do this, defendant
must introduce sufficiently conclusive evidence to negate one of the
requirements of section 328D.32
The fine distinctions between res ipsa loquitur and exclusive
control are now important only to Pennsylvania legal historians seek-
noted that while defendant's superior knowledge about how the event occurred was "a
very persuasive factor in the development of the principle," it is not an actual
requirement. Id. at § 328 D, comment k.
28. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 328D, comment 1. Note, however, that
initially the court must find sufficient evidence to allow reasonable men to draw the
inference of defendant's negligence. See 9 WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2487, at 278-79.
29. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 328B, comment b; id. at § 328C,
comment a.
30. PRoSSER, supra note 8, § 40, at 230; see RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at §
328D, comment 1; Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L
REV. 241, 261 (1936).
31. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 328D, comment n; PRossER, supra note
8, § 40, at 233; Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L.
REV. 241, 267 (1936).
Although not discussed in the supreme court's opinion, a question arises about
the effect of defendant's evidence of due care: Does it rebut the inference of
negligence after plaintiff has made out a res ipsa case? The Restatement asserts that
the inference is not necessarily overthrown. The jury may still conclude on the basis
of ordinary human experience that defendant did not exercise due care.
mhe jury may still be permitted to infer that the defendant's witnesses are
not to be believed, that something went wrong with the precautions de-
scribed, that the full truth has not been told. As the defendant's evidence
approaches complete demonstration that the event could not possibly have
occurred, it is all the more clearly contradicted by the fact that it has oc-
curred. Normally, therefore, a verdict cannot be directed for the defendant
in a res ipsa loquitur case, solely upon the basis of the defendant's evidence
of his own due care.
Prosser described defendant's burden in seeking a directed verdict as production of
"evidence which will destroy any reasonable inference of negligence, or so completely
contradict it that reasonable men could no longer accept it. The evidence necessary to
do this will vary with the strength of the inference." PRossER, supra note 8, § 40, at
233.
32. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 328D, comment o; PRossER, supra note
8, § 40, at 233-34.
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ing to show how formalistic the law has been. What originated in
England in 186311 as "nothing more than a commonsense appraisal
of the probative force of circumstantial evidence"34 has now swung
full circle. After involvement with numerous arbitrary requirements,
substantive tort duties, and differing procedural effects, res ipsa loqui-
tur has been returned to its proper position as a simple matter of
circumstantial evidence. Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc." certainly may be
added to the list of cases in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has not been "reluctant to simplify, clarify, and improve the law in
light of modem conditions." 6
33. Chief Baron Pollock in Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863), is
usually credited as the originator of the principle.
34. Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 605, 327 A.2d 94, 96 (1974).
35. 457 Pa. 602, 327 A.2d 94 (1974).
36. Id. at 612 n.27, 327 A.2d at 100 n.27.
[Casenote by David E. Holland.]
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